v2.0.0: 主题系统+SSH私钥解析修复+会话持久化+连接池优化+UI打磨

核心修复:
- ssh-service.ts: 新增 resolvePrivateKey()，将私钥文件路径(~/.ssh/id_rsa)解析为内容后传给 ssh2，
  解决 'Cannot parse privateKey: Unsupported key format' 错误
- useTerminalConnection.ts + sessionHelper.ts: 根据 authType 过滤字段，password/agent 认证不再传 privateKey
- sessionStore.ts: addSession() 现在先调用 sessionCreate() 持久化到 SQLite，解决恢复标签'无可用连接信息'问题
- database-service.ts: updateSession() 补充 private_key_path 字段持久化
- SessionDialog.tsx: 默认 username='root'、privateKey='~/.ssh/id_rsa'

UI/UX:
- 语义化主题系统(app-theme.ts)，强制深色模式，全局无边框设计
- macOS 标题栏支持双击最大化(window:toggleMaximize IPC)
- macOS 菜单栏('OpsXShell' 应用菜单 + Settings Cmd+,)
- WelcomeView 4卡片布局，移除 Settings 按钮
- TabBar/TabItem 背景色统一(bg-dark-800/900)，消除白色边框线

架构优化:
- SFTP 生命周期修复(useSFTP.ts useRef + autoConnectAttempted guard)
- 连接池竞态修复，支持快速多标签连接
- IPC 接口规范化，安全错误处理
- Vite 代码分割优化

质量: lint零错误 | tsc零错误 | build成功 | 49 tests pass

electron/ipc/file.ipc.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * File IPC Handlers
  * 处理本地文件操作和远程文件读写
+ * 安全增强：防止路径遍历攻击
  */
 
 import { ipcMain, IpcMainInvokeEvent, app } from 'electron'
@@ -21,25 +22,106 @@ export const FILE_CHANNELS = {
   LOCAL_MKDIR: 'local:mkdir',
 } as const
 
+// 允许的文件操作基础目录白名单
+const ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS: string[] = []
+
+/**
+ * 初始化允许的路径白名单
+ * 防止路径遍历攻击
+ */
+export function initializeAllowedPaths(): void {
+  ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.push(
+    app.getPath('home'),
+    app.getPath('downloads'),
+    app.getPath('documents'),
+    app.getPath('desktop'),
+    app.getPath('temp'),
+    app.getPath('userData'),
+  )
+  // 添加平台特定的常用目录
+  if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+    ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.push('/tmp', '/var/tmp')
+  } else if (process.platform === 'linux') {
+    ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.push('/tmp', '/var/tmp', '/home')
+  } else if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.push(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || '', process.env.TEMP || '')
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 验证文件路径是否在允许的范围内
+ * 防止路径遍历攻击（如 ../../../etc/passwd）
+ */
+function isPathAllowed(filePath: string): boolean {
+  // 规范化路径（解析 .. 和 .）
+  const resolved = path.resolve(filePath)
+
+  // 检查是否在允许的基目录下
+  const isUnderAllowedPath = ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.some((base) => {
+    if (!base) return false
+    const relative = path.relative(base, resolved)
+    return !relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative)
+  })
+
+  if (isUnderAllowedPath) return true
+
+  // 如果路径存在，检查其实际位置（处理符号链接）
+  try {
+    const real = fs.realpathSync(resolved)
+    return ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.some((base) => {
+      if (!base) return false
+      const relative = path.relative(base, real)
+      return !relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative)
+    })
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 安全地规范化路径
+ */
+function sanitizePath(inputPath: string): string {
+  // 移除 null 字节
+  const cleaned = inputPath.replace(/\0/g, '')
+  // 规范化路径
+  return path.resolve(cleaned)
+}
+
 export function registerFileIPCHandlers(): void {
+  // 确保白名单已初始化
+  if (ALLOWED_BASE_PATHS.length === 0) {
+    initializeAllowedPaths()
+  }
+
   // Read file (for rz)
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.READ, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, filePath: string) => {
     try {
-      const data = fs.readFileSync(filePath)
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(filePath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      const data = fs.readFileSync(safePath)
       return { success: true, data: data.toString('base64') }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Write file (for sz)
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.WRITE, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, filePath: string, data: string) => {
     try {
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(filePath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
       const buffer = Buffer.from(data, 'base64')
-      fs.writeFileSync(filePath, buffer)
+      fs.writeFileSync(safePath, buffer)
       return { success: true }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
@@ -48,15 +130,20 @@ export function registerFileIPCHandlers(): void {
     try {
       const homePath = app.getPath('home')
       return { success: true, path: homePath }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Read directory contents
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.LOCAL_READ_DIR, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, dirPath: string) => {
     try {
-      const entries = fs.readdirSync(dirPath, { withFileTypes: true })
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(dirPath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      const entries = fs.readdirSync(safePath, { withFileTypes: true })
       const files = entries.map((entry) => {
         const fullPath = path.join(dirPath, entry.name)
         let stats: fs.Stats | null = null
@@ -84,63 +171,85 @@ export function registerFileIPCHandlers(): void {
       })
 
       return { success: true, files }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Get file stats
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.LOCAL_GET_STATS, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, filePath: string) => {
     try {
-      const stats = fs.lstatSync(filePath)
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(filePath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      const stats = fs.lstatSync(safePath)
       return {
         success: true,
         stats: {
-          name: path.basename(filePath),
-          path: filePath,
+          name: path.basename(safePath),
+          path: safePath,
           type: stats.isDirectory() ? 'directory' : stats.isSymbolicLink() ? 'symlink' : 'file',
           size: stats.size,
           modified: Math.floor(stats.mtime.getTime() / 1000),
           permissions: formatPermissions(stats.mode),
         },
       }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Delete file or directory
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.LOCAL_DELETE, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, filePath: string) => {
     try {
-      const stats = fs.lstatSync(filePath)
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(filePath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      const stats = fs.lstatSync(safePath)
       if (stats.isDirectory()) {
-        fs.rmSync(filePath, { recursive: true, force: true })
+        fs.rmSync(safePath, { recursive: true, force: true })
       } else {
-        fs.unlinkSync(filePath)
+        fs.unlinkSync(safePath)
       }
       return { success: true }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Rename file or directory
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.LOCAL_RENAME, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, oldPath: string, newPath: string) => {
     try {
-      fs.renameSync(oldPath, newPath)
+      const safeOld = sanitizePath(oldPath)
+      const safeNew = sanitizePath(newPath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safeOld) || !isPathAllowed(safeNew)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      fs.renameSync(safeOld, safeNew)
       return { success: true }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 
   // Create directory
   ipcMain.handle(FILE_CHANNELS.LOCAL_MKDIR, async (_event: IpcMainInvokeEvent, dirPath: string) => {
     try {
-      fs.mkdirSync(dirPath, { recursive: true })
+      const safePath = sanitizePath(dirPath)
+      if (!isPathAllowed(safePath)) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Access denied: path traversal detected' }
+      }
+      fs.mkdirSync(safePath, { recursive: true })
       return { success: true }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      return { success: false, error: error.message }
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+      return { success: false, error: message }
     }
   })
 }